Policy and War
Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli? was an? Italian? philosopher and writer based in Florence during the? Renaissance. He is one of the main founders of modern? political science.? He was a diplomat,? political philosopher, playwright, and a civil servant of the? Florentine Republic. He also wrote comedies, carnival songs, poetry, and some of the most well-known personal correspondence in the Italian language. His position in the regime of Florence as Secretary to the Second? Chancery? of the? Republic of Florence? lasted from 1498 to 1512, the period in which the de? Medici? were not in power. The period when most of his well-known writing was done was after this, when they recovered power, and Machiavelli was removed from all functions.
None of the product in the history of political thought did not cause as much controversy as the “Prince” of Italian political thinker, historian and statesman, Niccolo Machiavelli.”Prince” is an instruction made wise policy expertise to the governor – the monarch, to whom the task of consolidating their power and prosperity of the state.? This – the main goal sovereign, and to achieve it, he should devote himself, not in spite of everything.The name of Machiavellis maxim binds: “the end justifies the means.”? According to her pursuit of high-end allowed the most dishonest action.? Thus, Machiavelli admiringly describes the policy of Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, who, through cunning, guile and the pressure could split or scatter the enemies, to win the love of the people and strengthen the inherited his power.? “Great idea, and lofty goal” was to justify all its actions.? “The passion for winning – is natural for the rulers, and never condemn those who, soberly aware of its capabilities, translates it into a successful policy to the prosperity of the state and for the benefit of the people.
Political morality. of ? “Prince” – is implicitly a polemical essay.? In formulating the instructions to the governor, Machiavelli takes obvious, although not explicitly declare a polemic with classical ideas about the ethics of governors, expressed, for example by Cicero in his treatise “On Duties” or Seneca in “moral letters to Lutsiliyu.? Machiavelli, like the classical writers, says that the emperor should strive for the great deeds that will bring him honor, glory and good memory of posterity, that he should be brave and able to courageously confront the onslaught of fate.? However, none of this sovereign will not succeed, blindly following a capital virtues, ie,? being honest, tender-hearted, gracious, sincere and pious, as described by the philosophers of virtue does not always lead to glory and greatness.? Sovereign should look virtuous and be so in reality, but internally have the willingness to save and opposite qualities, if this proves necessary. “?
Machiavelli thus establishes a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, moral interpersonal relations, which are most valued by respect for the welfare of a particular person, or personal morality, in which the most important – the salvation of souls, and, on the other hand, political morality, in? is important – the welfare and prosperity of the state.Principles promoted by the different systems of morality, are not comparable.? In the political morality person acting on behalf of the state and for his sake.? The governor represents the power and the state.? Dedication expected of ordinary people are usually not acceptable in the case of the emperor, as his personal dedication may actually mean the collapse of the power and the fall of the state.
Political Ethics of Machiavelli realistic.? This ethic that exists, but it should not.? It does not admit of giving valid for an ideal.? Professes good must understand that to follow the good wrong in all circumstances of life, especially in relations with those who are alien to good, and many such people.? While humanity is expressed in the fact that the emperor should be the law, including with respect to the enemy, he should bear in mind that many people do not understand the language of the law, and with them the need to speak the language of animal power.? Therefore, the sovereign must accept some of the habits of the animal, and best of all – the habits of the lion and the fox: being akin to a lion, he will be able to resist a hostile force, as being akin to the fox, he can avoid the snares of cunning and deceit.
prince should not be afraid of accusations of cruelty and he should realize that subjects obeying out of fear, more reliable ones that obey out of love.? As Machiavelli explains, “For the love of his own discretion, and fear – at the discretion of rulers, so the wise ruler is better to rely on what depends on him, rather than from someone else.”? Moreover, the cruelty must pursue well-defined and clear goals, people must understand that the sovereign has resorted to violence not from wilfulness, but for the sake of the state.? In the violence should not persist, and if you had to resort to it, it is necessary to apply it once, so that the brutality has always been on the decline.
However, instilling fear, avoid hatred and contempt of his subjects.? Contempt in the prince cause instability, frivolity, effeminacy, cowardice and indecision.? And, conversely, generosity, courage, solidity and firmness inspire reverence.? To avoid hatred, should be assigned the case, unwanted subjects, on the other, and the like – to fulfill himself.
Prince should do anything to cause worship and inspire greatness.? Contributed to this military success and the company (particularly unusual) in defense of religion, major government decisions and certainty in politics – in its relations with allies and adversaries, as well as the protection of gifted people in the arts and crafts and efforts anyone else, care about? prosperity of the state.
Machiavelli – one of the most difficult to understand and interpret thinkers.? No accident for the past four and a half centuries around its core product ?«Prince?» being polemical battles, and its doctrine and beliefs compressed into a sharply negative term “Machiavellianism” – a synonym for political treachery, duplicity, hypocrisy, treachery, cruelty, etc
For us, Machiavelli and his works are primarily concrete historical and cultural value.? As one of the largest and most remarkable representatives of the Renaissance, Machiavelli relates life-giving traditions of thought and culture with a new time and modernity.? Of his works confront us with the entire intellectual, socio-political picture of the Renaissance, with its humanistic achievements and the concrete historical limitations, with all its contradictions, the search and struggle.? On his works, perhaps most clearly be traced as the history of the historic dialogue with the thinkers of the past and thinking of past eras born theory, both from a critical and creative development of innovation and tradition is born as a retrospective of the consideration from the standpoint of the most fundamental and most critical? problems of modern life, produced by the prospect of historical development.
By the 1580th years, Elizabeth has got to disgrace at defined Phillip II to Spain. Not only that she was Protestant, not only she refused its marriage of offers of years back, it also has directed Leicester to the Netherlands for struggle against Spaniards in 1585. Besides, it secretly supports attacks of sir Frencis Drake on Spanish galleons treasure coming back of New Light, in September, 1580 Drake has returned from sailing worldwide with cargo of the Spanish gold. When Elizabeth killed its Catholic contender Maria, the queen of Scotland, Phillip has lost patience. England for themselves are personally revolted and wanted England for himself, has decided in 1587 that time for intrusion into England has come. was preparing Armada when Drake has resulted a touch on armada in Cadiz in April, 1587. This attack was for Spanish completely unawares, and Drakes maneuver set back Spanish of intrusion about one year. Drake also was possible to steal some Spanish treasures in the spot-check. In July, 1588, Phillip, at last, was possible to start ostensibly invincible Spanish Armada. Its hope of a swing of fleet of the Netherlands to take away the army there, and to transport them through English channel for land intrusion.
The conflict to the Spanish Armada are presented height long struggle between Protestant England and Catholic Spain. Up to attempt of intrusion of Phillip, Elizabeth constantly tried to carry on negotiations the way to the world. Really, persistently believing, that the world can be reached without struggle, it was not present enough that are ready its fleet which as the result, has entered fight a little unawares. Nevertheless, navy fleet was priority Elizabeth throughout the board and when Armada the British vessels face, they were in for surprise. Englands 34 ships were in a good condition, and Phillip, working on scandalous am mistaken information, that the British ships were rotting hull. During war, Elizabeth micro-operated all expenses infuriating walsingham.
Elizabeth had a private arrangement with Sir Francis Drake. She encouraged and partially financed him in his raiding of Spanish treasure ships, and rewarded him handsomely for his exploits. She even promised to disavow any knowledge of his actions were he to be caught. As Elizabeth loved nothing so much as making money, Drake was one of her famed “favorites”. When the voyage that returned in 1580 brought a 100% return, doubling Elizabeths investment, she held a massive feast aboard his ship, the Golden Hind, the following April, knighting him for his service. Drake was ready with an exotically themed gift for the Queen: a frog made of diamonds.
Phillip had other reasons for intrusion into England Besides, its indignation on Drakes feats, its companions, performance Catholic, and numerous traumas of its pride: on not clear genealogical a way, Phillip some insignificant claims to an English crown of. Though he should know better, it covered imaginations, that English Catholics waited for him to come and liberate them. . If he had been a better judge of human nature, he would have realized that the English people would never accept their Spanish foe as a ruler. Philip tried to diminish the English peoples anger regarding the invasion by claiming that the attack was not aimed against the people, but at the illegitimate Queen. This was a well-calculated move to get the Catholics on his side, but unfortunately for Philip his army never landed.
Philip blamed the weather (the so-called “Protestant Wind”) for his loss, and excused himself with the statement, “I sent the Armada against men, not Gods winds and waves.” But the weather alone did not bring the English their victory: the English vessels outmaneuvered and outfought the Armada. They won several decisive battles with a naval technique called “broadsiding” that they had newly begun to perfect: this technique involved facing the enemy with the port (left-hand) or starboard (right-hand) side of a ship, rather than facing them head-on; this brought a higher number of guns into action at any one time. Furthermore, popular legend has it that the English ships were smaller than the Spanish, and because of this the ships were more maneuverable. Whether or not they were actually smaller is still debated; however, they were more maneuverable: the English ships were designed lower to the water than the tall galleons, which were meant to be intimidating but which ultimately presented large targets towering out of the waves.
Even as England faced invasion from Catholic Spains Armada, the large number of Catholics in England remained loyal to Elizabeth. After leading England through 30 years of prosperity, she enjoyed popularity even among her religious opponents.
Why did the English win
1. They were near to their naval ports and did not have to travel far to fight the Armada.
2. The English had many advantages with regards to the ships they used. The Spanish put their hope in the power of the galleons. The English used smaller but faster ships. However, they could do little to penetrate the crescent shape of the Armada even though they had powerful cannons on board.
3. The Spanish had different tactics to the English. The English wanted to sink the Spanish ships whereas the Spanish wanted to board our ships and then capture them. To do this they would have to come up alongside our ships leaving them exposed to a broadside from English cannons on our ships.
4. Our ships, being smaller than the Spanish galleons, were more manoeuvrable which was a valuable advantage.
5. The biggest reason for the victory of the English, was the fatal error in the plan of the Spanish. While it sailed in a crescent shape, the Armada was relatively safe. But part of its plan was to stop, pick up sailors and then sail to England. The simple fact that the plan involved stopping the Armada, meant that it was fatally flawed. Warships on the move and in formation gave the Armada protection. Once the ships were still, they were open to attack.
The victory over the Armada was to make Sir Francis Drake a very famous man. The victory was even remembered at Christmas when Elizabeth ordered that everybody should have goose on Xmas Day as that was the meal she had eaten on the evening that she learned that her navy had beaten the Armada.
The Federalist Papers are a series of 85 articles or essays advocating the ratification of the United States Constitution. Seventy-seven of the essays were published serially in The Independent Journal and The New York Packet between October 1787 and August 1788. The Federalist Papers were published by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in New York during 1787 and 1788. They were published to sway opinion in New York into ratifying the new American constitution. One of the most important papers in federalists is the tenth, The argument Madison makes is that faction and liberty are inseparable. Instead of focusing on trying to eliminate the causes for faction, the choice of government can control the effects of faction. Madison makes the argument that the means to control the causes of faction is to stamp on dissenting opinions, and remove liberty. In other words oppress until all the polity is of the same opinion. This is totalitarianism. Madison dismisses this as being against the nature of man;
Any individual needs to be concerned about government using the apparatus of the nation-state for the purposes of coercion. Madison was also concerned with this issue, he saw the violence of faction being when a group of individuals created a faction with a common interest that was adverse to individual rights, the rights of minorities and against the common good. Madisons view of common good is similar to the Aristotlean notion of virtue being necessary in the ruling elite.
The Federalist Paper No.10 argues that a republic is capable of controlling the effects of faction, more so than a democracy. The reason put forward is that a system of representation is more capable of protecting the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as being better able to balance the needs of the public good. Madison notes that representatives are more divorced from the issues being raised by factions and consequently better able to create just legislation that is compatible with rights and the public good.
While many of the Federalist Papers seem repetitive, emphasizing the same points over and over again, it is important to remember that the Federalist Papers, were not designed to be like a book, read cover to cover, expounding the strengths of the Constitution, but rather, a piece of propaganda appearing in a newspaper. Clearly, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison did not assume that their readers were familiar with all of their words and hence the repetitive nature of their work.
The “precious advantage” that the United States had in 1787 that offered hope for a “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government the circumstance which would delay the necessity of accepting Hamiltons favored form of mixed monarchy lay in the predominance of small freehold farmers among the American population. Since the time of Aristotle, it had been recognized that yeoman farmers a middle class between the greedy rich and the envious poor provided the most stable foundation upon which to erect a popular government. This factor, commented on by Madison, Pinckney, Adams, and others, helps explain why the Convention did not feel it necessary to sacrifice either majority rule or popular responsibility in their new Constitution.
It is interesting to note that the plan that Hamilton defends in this paper was not ?theoretically the soundest. The leaders of the Convention realized that a theoretical best and member after member went on record praising the British constitution as the best ever created by man a theoretical best might be the enemy of a possible good. As Pierce Butler insisted, in a different context, “The people will not bear such innovations?Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best government he could devise, but the best they would receive. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780 in Burg bei Magdeburg, Kingdom of Prussia, the fourth and youngest son of a lower middle-class family. His grandfather, the son of a Lutheran pastor, had been a professor of theology. Clausewitzs father was once a lieutenant in the Prussian army and held a minor post in the Prussian internal revenue service. Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a Lance-Corporal, eventually attaining the rank of Major-General. Clausewitzs writings are of fundamental importance not only for their actual content but because they have done so much to influence almost all subsequent Western military thinkers. Even Antoine-Henri Jomini, often improperly understood as Clausewitzs “opposite,” read On War. His own Summary of the Art of War (1838) contains not only several personal insults to Clausewitz but also a great many adaptations of and adjustments to his arguments. The Marxist-Leninists carried him off in their peculiar direction, navalists like Sir Julian Stafford Corbett and the airpower theorists in others, and American nuclear strategists in yet another. It is therefore hard to understand or appreciate the ways in which modern thinkers diverge without an understanding of this central influence. This is true, not despite, but because of the way in which Clausewitzs original concepts have been denied, misunderstood, confused, distorted, evolved, adopted, adapted, and mutated through varying historical circumstances over the past 164 years. This represents not a weakness of Clausewitzian theory but its fundamental, flexible, adaptable stength??”if also sometimes the willfulness or boneheadedness of its consumers. The great value of On War is that it integrates a vast range of military concerns (political, strategic, operational, tactical, analytical, historical, and pedagogical) within this fundamental socio-political framework. No other coherent body of theory comes close to successfully interrelating such a wide range of considerations, and none is so flexible in adapting to political and historical change. Otherwise, we would not still be arguing about it. The theory of warfare tries to discover how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. As this is not always possible, theory also teaches us to calculate moral factors: the likely mistakes of the enemy, the impression created by a daring action, . . . yes, even our own desperation. None of these things lie outside the realm of the theory and art of war, which is nothing but the result of reasonable reflection on all the possible situations encountered during a war. We should think very frequently of the most dangerous of these situations and familiarize ourselves with it. Only thus shall we reach heroic decisions based on reason, which no critic can ever shake.
War is a combination of many distinct engagements. Such a combination may or may not be reasonable, and success depends very much on this. Yet the engagement itself is for the moment more important. For only a combination of successful engagements can lead to good results. The most important thing in war will always be the art of defeating our opponent in combat.
Carl von Clausewitz??™s purpose in analyzing war is purely theoretical and not prescriptive. To the question ???What is war??? he answers: ???War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will War is not an isolated act; it is an extension of Politic??”a blatant instrument of such policy. The decision to go to war and the proposed goal beyond victory are political, not military. Theory must, however, be analyzed in the context of real events. A paper war is not a real war; a real war is subject to influence by chance and circumstance. Real war is dangerous for its participants and is a test of their exertion.
War is not only ???an elaborate duel??? a vast drama??”a comedy for the victor, a tragedy for the loser. From another point of view, war is a game and a ???gamble???, both objectively and subjectively. A theory of war must be an analytical investigation that later might prove beneficial to reason and judgment. It must consider the ends and means of warfare, which consist of strategy and tactics. Tactics are the uses to which the army is put to achieve victory. Strategy has to do with the plan for achieving victory. The real activity of war lies in the tactical aspect of battle, since tactics govern fighting. The immediate object of battle is to destroy or overcome the enemy, but the ultimate object is to subject the enemy to one??™s will in a political sense. Toward this end a combatant may desire to enforce whatever peace it pleases; it may occupy the enemy??™s frontier districts and use them to make satisfactory bargains at the peace settlements.
Main goal in this paper has been to explore Clausewitz??™s ideas in two main areas. The first is Clausewitz??™s ethical outlook on the problem of war, and the second is his view on the role of moral opportunity in international affairs. In both foreign policy and war, Clausewitz seems to accept that those in the service of the state should act in accordance with an ethic of responsibility, and subordinate personal moral concerns to the state??™s interests. However,
Clausewitz does not argue that the content of these state interests is predetermined. Their variance over time has implications for limitations on decisions to go to war, limitations on actions within war, and opportunities for developing amity in international affairs.
Many of Clausewitz??™s key themes also contain an either implicit or explicit argument for the benefits of moderation. Clausewitz??™s work on war reflects sensitivity to its costs, and a seeming disapproval of senseless violence and destruction. In fact, he is more likely to look on the use of force with the tragic acceptance of Max Weber than with the almost gleeful anticipation of Machiavelli. At the same time, he accepts that war is a continual prospect. Its devastation can at best be limited, and this limitation is possible only to the extent that statesmen and commanders on both sides of a conflict are able to manage a rational balancing of means and purposes. As for the opportunity to seek and act in accordance with common interests in international affairs, Clausewitz is likely to have seen it as a theoretical possibility, but also to have thought that it had little role to play in his own times.
What one will not find in Clausewitz is a story of progress. He does not explore how the subject of his master work could become obsolete, or even more rare, in the affairs of mankind. However, Clausewitz does suggest that
limitations on the use of force between states are dependent on the characteristics of the age. To evaluate the prospects, statesmen must judge the nature of the societies and governments involved, and the relationships between them. It seems likely that, if statesmen were to undertake such an examination in today??™s world, many of them would not find their state??™s existence so threatened that there is no room for choice.